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THE TRUE FUNCTION OF THE ATTESTATION
CLAUSE IN A WILL
ROGER L. SEVERNS'
A DECISION of the Supreme Court of the State of Illi-
nois in 1926 aroused considerable interest because of
the rather unusual circumstances of the case and also be-
cause the decision is susceptible of a construction which
apparently overturns what has been considered to be the
settled law of this state for many years.' The case involved
a will-one of several spurious wills-claimed to be that of
Edward B. Jennings, eccentric millionaire of Chicago.
Upon proceedings for probate of the will, one of the at-
testing witnesses testified that the will was executed in
the presence of himself and a stranger whom he did not
know. This witness identified his own signature to the
attestation clause and also swore that the writing, "1J.
M. Gordon," beneath his own, was that placed there by
the stranger. No one could be found who was familiar
with the handwriting of the stranger and no witness
could be produced who knew "J. M. Gordon."
The case reached the Supreme Court on appeal and the
court decided that the will was not entitled to probate.
The decision was unquestionably correct, but the reasons
given in the opinion were perhaps unfortunate. Appar-
ently the court placed its decision upon the ground that
two witnesses were not produced who proved the execu-
tion of the will. It has been repeatedly held in this and
many other jurisdictions that it is not necessary to produce
attesting witnesses if they are dead or absent from the
jurisdiction. Perhaps the court might better have placed
its decision upon the ground that the will was not proved
to have been attested by two witnesses as required by the
statute. The name "J. M. Gordon" signed to the will
was a mere name. It was not proved that the signature
1 Associate Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
2 Hill v. Chicago Title and Trust Company, 322 Ill. 42.
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was that of the stranger, nor that the stranger was "J.
M. Gordon. I"
A consideration of the development of any of the prin-
ciples of our modern law of evidence is as interesting and
instructive as it is essential to an understanding of the
application of those principles to the problem of proof.
To understand and apply, we must trace an idea or a prin-
ciple through obscurity to the roots from which it sprung.
It is sometimes true that the continuity of development
which we endeavor to find is lost-or nearly lost-in the
darkness of customary law of which no written records
have remained. Yet there is often a discernible trail,
however indistinct, which we may follow far enough to as-
certain the probable origin of our modern principle.
Presumptions of fact have existed in the common law
since very early times. Many of these have withstood
the changes in the law, and some have found recognition
in our day through statutory enactment. Others, equally
vigorous, have become so generally accepted as part of
the law that they exist today without declaratory legis-
lation. However, an inquiry into the nature and basis of
any presumption necessarily must be conducted in rela-
tion to the statutory law which may have limited, modi-
fied, or even broadened its modern application.
Decisions in the courts of many states during the last
twenty years have enunciated a presumption which has
had an interesting development. This presumption has
become so firmly established that its existence and cor-
rectness perhaps are no longer controversial questions.
However, in applying the presumption to certain sets of
circumstances, there has been a curious failure on the
part of most courts to appreciate the nature of the evi-
dence which gives rise to the presumption.
It has been held in many jurisdictions that where the
attesting witnesses to a will are dead or absent from the
jurisdiction a presumption arises from proof of their
3 For a discussion of this case see comment by John H. Wigmore in 26
Illinois Law Review 572.
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handwriting that the will was duly executed. It is our
purpose to discuss this presumption and to trace, if pos-
sible, its origin and development. It is natural to expect,
in the case of a will which includes an attestation clause
reciting the facts essential to due execution of the instru-
ment, that the presumption will take on a new aspect, and
our inquiry to some extent will be addressed to this feat-
ure.
It is obvious at the outset that this presumption did
not arise fully developed with the passing of statutes pre-
scribing formalities to be observed in the execution of
wills. We expect to find its roots in some older principle
of law or procedure which developed as part of our com-
mon law. In order to form some conclusion as to the
nature of the presumption, it is necessary to consider the
function of the attesting witness and the development
of the use of documents in our law. It is well to remem-
ber that the operation of the presumption is limited to
those cases in which the attesting witnesses cannot be
produced. True enough, what the courts choose to call
a presumption may operate where the witnesses do not
remember the facts or where their testimony is conflict-
ing, but this is merely a further extension of the doc-
trine under consideration.
The beginnings of the rule that such witnesses must be
produced lie far back in the realm of the customary law
of the Germanic tribes. The attesting witness belongs
to that class of transaction or business witnesses found
in the law among the early Germans. 4 It is to be remem-
bered that the Germanic law was a law characterized by
rigid formality of transaction. If acts were to have legal
effect, just the right words had to be said and the exact
ceremony observed. Sales were consummated in public
according to a prescribed form before witnesses who
swore to the fact of the transfer. The right to hold and
enjoy land-we cannot speak of titles at this stage-was
transferred by the formal act of symbolic delivery of the
4 James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the
Common Law. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1898. Pp. 501-503.
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land before witnesses. Accompanying this emphasis up-
on the formal transaction was the strict adherence to
the rule that the sale or the transfer of land could be
proved only by the transaction witnesses. The reason for
this rule was the fact that such witnesses were the only
ones who could be compelled to come before a court. By
consenting to act as witnesses to transactions, they were
considered as assenting in advance to a compulsory sum-
mons. No witness, regardless of his knowledge, could be
called to prove a transaction except those pre-appointed
at the time of the transaction itself. It seems reasonable,
therefore, that when such witnesses at a later time al-
lowed their names to be written into documents and thus
became attesting witnesses, they did so with the idea
of assenting to a summons if it became necessary to prove
the document.
We may be sure that when these transaction witnesses
were summoned to give testimony, it was the transaction
or act that was proved by them and not the document.
Documents, using the term in the sense of a formal or
solemn instrument, have a significance for us much dif-
ferent from that which they had for the Germanic tribes-
man in the days of the invasion.5
It seems indisputable that the document when first
encountered by the early Germans, who found it in use
among the Romans, was regarded with suspicion and dis-
trust. Writing was an art almost unknown to them, and
although the document was adopted and used by them, it
was early given a different significance from that which
was attached to it by the educated Romans.
As has been mentioned before, the law of the Germanic
tribes was a law of formal symbolic oral transactions in
5 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of
Evidence at Common Law, (2nd ed.). Boston: Little, Brown, and Com-
pany, 1923. Sees. 1287, 1505, and 2426.
Much of what is here said in relation to the history of documents and
documentary evidence must be credited to Professor Wigmore, who has
painstakingly compared the authorities and whose researches form a
splendid contribution to the history of the law.
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which were used such symbols as the knife, the glove, the
wand, the broken twig, and the piece of sod.' Two men
would go upon land, and one would formally and with
prescribed words cut with the knife a piece of sod which
he would deliver to the other. He might deliver the
knife also, or he might bend it to distinguish it from all
other knives and keep it himself. Later, when docu-
ments formed a part of the ceremony, the knife was some-
times attached to the document. This symbolic transfer
became livery of seisin. With this emphasis upon de-
livery and this careful attention to form, it is natural to
expect that when the Germanic tribesman made use of
the document or "carta", he attached to it a symbolic
significance. It meant to him what the knife or the glove
meant. Its character as a written instrument was not
recognized by those who did not write.
Two facts must have appealed to the early Germanic
tribesman after he regarded writing with a little less
distrust; and a recognition of these facts would certainly
accelerate the adoption of the document. First, the docu-
ment provided a method by which formal symbolic deliv-
ery of the land could be made away from the land itself.
Second, the document provided a means of preserving the
names of the transaction witnesses. It seems tr.e that
at this period the probative value of the document lay
only in the witnesses to it, 7 for if the terms of the docu-
ment were disputed, they could be proved only by the
transaction witnesses.
It is probable that by a slow process, accompanied by
the spread of the art of writing in England, the document
came to occupy a somewhat different relation to the
transaction in which it was used. We have seen that in
the early stages its significance was that of a symbol, and
its probative force lay in its record of the names of the
transaction witnesses. But as men became more familiar
6 Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History of
English Law, (2nd ed.). Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press,
1911. Vol. II, pp. 83-90.
7 Wigmore, Vol. V, see. 2426, p. 293.
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with writing, the terms of the document gradually at-
tained some significance, and the document itself became
evidence of the transaction. Its terms were still disput-
able by the testimony of the witnesses. And men were still
quoting the amusing couplet mentioned by Professor Wig-
more in a quotation from Fickler:
"On parchment scribes may place with ease
Exactly what their own minds please."
It seems safe to say that the seal provided the means
of accomplishing a change in the character of the docu-
ment as evidence. It not only provided the means for
authenticating a document but was also the instrumental-
ity which later rendered documents indisputable as to
terms.8 It was long after the seal became common how-
ever,9 that the document as a formal instrument became
in terms indisputable.
The tool for shaping the new doctrine had now been sup-
plied; and it remained to develop and extend the doctrine.
Here it must be remembered that in Anglo-Norman times peo-
ple are still, on the whole, unfamiliar with writing, and the
chief varieties of transaction-namely, those affecting land-
are still practiced with oral forms; the essential, working con-
ception is the livery of seisin, not the charter. Whatever vir-
tue there is in the writing is testimonial only. It furnishes
one sort of proof; but it is not a necessary kind of proof, and
the main thing is something done apart from the writing.
'"This indenture" merely "witnesseth"; and the now time-
worn phrase was once the actual conception."'
With the vogue of the seal the transaction witness was
no longer essential to the progress of the case. Begin-
ning with the use of the seal by the king on state docu-
ments, such documents became indisputable, since no one
may give the lie to the king. Over a course of years the
8 Wigmore, Vol. V, see. 2426, p. 294-5.
9 The use of the seal had become general by the thirteenth century,
according to Professor Wigmore.
lOWigmore, Vol. V, see. 2426, pp. 295-6.
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use of the seal became general and proof of the terms of
the document by the transaction witness waned. Men
looked to the seal of their adversary to establish the docu-
ment. From being merely evidence of the act-" this
indenture witnesseth"-the document became the act it-
self. From the case of Rye v. Humby," cited by Pro-
fessor Wigmore, we know that in 1314 the-terms of a deed
were still disputable where livery of seisin was accom-
panied by an oral condition. But, the rule that docu-
ments relating to realty are indisputable by parol evi-
dence was well established by the sixteen hundreds.'
2
What effect did this change in the conception of the
document have upon the manner and mode of proof? In
the procedure followed among the Germanic tribes, the
transaction witnesses were once summoned with, and as
part of, the jury.1" This practice seems to have continued
down to as late as the fourteenth century, when it began
to disappear. 4
We have before noted that when the use of the seal
began to render documents indisputable, the necessity for
the tesimony or oaths of the transaction witnesses was no
longer felt, since the terms of the document were estab-
lished by the document itself. With this change, we
might expect to find the names of witnesses no longer at-
tached to documents. However, this was not the case,
for the problem of proving the execution of the docu-
ment still remained. The attesting or transaction wit-
nesses were still retained to attest the fact of execution.
It is at this point, then, that we may expect to find the
beginnings of our presumption. Witnesses are now sign-
ing their names to documents themselves. Instead of a
mere record or memo of the names of the witnesses, so
much of the document as relates to the witnesses becomes
a record of an act done by them.
11 Selden Society (Year Books of 8 Edward TI), Vol. XXXVII, pp. 36-
51.
12 Wigmore, Vol. V, sec. 2426, p. 297.
13 Thayer, p. 97.
14 Thayer, pp. 101-2.
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It seems logical to assume that at the time when wit-
nesses to documents became attesting witnesses-that is
to say, at the time they ceased to be transaction witnesses
and became witnesses only to the execution, the rule that
such witnesses must be produced continued as an out-
growth of the earlier rule that the transaction witnesses
must testify. 5 At least in modified form, this rule has
continued down to the present day. Under modern stat-
utes it is limited in application to those documents re-
quired, by law to be attested.16
The necessity of producing the transaction witness was
absolute, and it is possible that this may have been the
rule at first with respect to attesting witnesses where
execution was in issue. But we begin to find, in cases
decided in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries,
statements that such witnesses were unavailable. 7 At
this point the presumption of execution is taking form.
Since we are concerned particularly with the operation
of the presumption in the law of wills, it is necessary to
consider how a presumption of due execution of a will
may arise. The Statute of Frauds, passed by Parliament
in 1676, set forth certain formalities to be observed in
the execution of wills.'" By this statute it was provided
that all devises of land must be in writing and signed by
the person devising, or by some other person in his pres-
ence and by his express directions, and must be attested
and subscribed in the presence of the testator by three
or four credible witnesses.
In order to ascertain the basis of the evidence giving
rise to the presumption under consideration, we must
consider separately those cases in which there was an at-
testation clause and those in which there was a lack of
such a clause.
15 Wigmore, Vol. II, see. 1287, p. 938.
16 Cf. Cahill's Ill. Rev. St. (1931), Ch. 51, see. 49.
17 Henley v. Philips, (1740) 2 Atk. 48; Ludlam on the demise of
H-unt, (1774) Lofft 362.
18 29 Car. II, c. 3&
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in 1694, Lord Holt decided the statute was satisfied
in the case of Dayrell v. Glasscock in spite of the fact that
one of but three witnesses-the minimum number re-
quired-would not swear he had seen the testator seal
and publish the will, where that witness' handwriting
and act of signing were proved.1" It does not appear
whether there was an attestation clause to this will. A
case decided some two hundred years later gives us a
good example of the operation of the presumption in
England, and it is enlightening as to what the court con-
siders the basis of the presumption. 0
In the latter case both attesting witnesses were dead,
there was no attestation clause, and the handwriting of
only one of the witnesses was proved. A quotation from
the opinion seems necessary:
Jeune, P. There is no authority governing this case. Two
things may be laid down as general principles. The first is,
that the Court is always extremely anxious to give effect to the
wishes of persons if satisfied that they really are their testa-
mentary wishes; and, secondly, the Court will not allow a mat-
ter of form to stand in the way if the essential elements of
execution have been fulfilled. Those are principles which I
can act upon, although I am conscious that in this case, where
there is no attestation clause at all, I am going to the furthest
limit. ....
I find that the document before me was signed by the testa-
trix, and that there are upon it the signatures of two persons
who are both dead, and one of whom, at any rate, was a person
who was not unlikely to be a witness to a document for the
deceased, and the signature of the other of whom is proved.
With these facts found, I look at the document, and, irregular
and informal as it is, I am justified in holding that the testa-
trix did intend it for her will. It was signed by her and by
two other persons, and, although there is nothing on the face
of the will to shew it, I hold, on the principle Omnia praesum-
19 Skinner 413.
20 In the Goods of Frances Peverett, L. 1. [1902], P. 205.
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untur rite esse acta, that it was signed first by the testatrix and
then by the two other persons as witnesses, all three being pres-
ent at the same time.
Taking this case as an example, we may say three
things concerning the presumption are established. First,
the basis of the presumption is one of necessity. It is
applied in order that the will shall not fail. Second, the
presumption arises upon proof of the handwriting of
the witnesses. Third, the presumption is applied be-
cause the court will presume that where an act is proved
to have been done, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
it was rightly done. The doctrine may then be stated this
way: Where the signatures of the witnesses to a will are
proved, and the witnesses are unavailable, it will be pre-
sumed that the statutory requirements as to due execu-
tion were complied with. This principle is subject to
the limitation that the will itself must appear regular on
its face.2'
It now becomes material to consider the effect of an
attestation clause upon the principle just set forth. It
is well to remember at the outset that an attestation
clause to a will was early decided not to be a formal
requisite.2 The case of Hands v. James,3 decided in
1735, is interesting to consider in the light of the cases
that follow. In this case the attestation clause did not
contain a recital that the witnesses signed in the presence
of the testator. But the very fact that three witnesses
signed the will was held to be a circumstance which the
jury might consider as tending to prove that the wit-
nesses acted in compliance with the statute. In other
words, the will may not have been properly executed,
but the probabilities are that it was; and bearing that
in mind, the jury is entitled to presume due execution
from the fact that the witnesses did sign.
21 Burgoyne v. Showler, 1 Rob. Ece. 5.
22 Roberts v. Phillips, 4 E. & B. 450.
23 2 Comyns 531.
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In the cases thus far considered the attesting witnesses
were dead or absent from the jurisdiction. Two other
classes of cases should be discussed before summing up
the rules applied in the English decisions. In the first
class, the presumption of due execution is applied where
the witnesses are unable to recollect the circumstances
attending the execution and attestation. The rule gen-
erally applied in these cases seems to be that where there
is a full and complete attestation clause reciting the
facts essential to execution and attestation, mere failure
of memory will not defeat the will; but due execution
will be presumed. 4 Where the attestation clause is de-
fective or incomplete, the presumption is less strong, but
the court will look to all the circumstances, and probate
will be granted if the will appears regular on its face.
25
A statement of the manner in which the presumption is
applied in this class of cases is found in Vinnicombe v.
Butler,26 where the court says:
When there is a regular attestation clause, with the names
of two witnesses appended thereto, leading to the conclusion
that the will was executed by a person who knew the require-
ments of the Wills Act, the principle applies directly, and it
may be presumed that the will was duly executed, and the
mere failure of memory of the witnesses will go for nothing.
But where there is an informal attestation clause, such as in
the present case, which leads to the conclusion that the testa-
trix did not know the requirements of the Wills Act, the presump-
tion will not apply with the same force. In every case of this
kind the court should be influenced by a strong desire that
the intention of the testator be not frustrated by the lapse of
time and failure of the memory of the witnesses.
The second class of cases to be discussed is that in
which the testimony of the witnesses is contradictory.
Here, as in the cases just discussed, we find the courts
applying the presumption, omnia praesumuntur rite esse
24Woodhouse v. Balfour, L. R. 13 Pro. Div. 2; Pitt v. Pitt, 39 J.
P. 568.
25 In the Goods of Rees, 29 J. P. 296.
26 3 Sw. & Tr. 580.
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acta. Where the testimony of the witnesses is conflict-
ing, hesitant, or uncertain, the court may look to all the
facts and circumstances, and may in the exercise of its
discretion apply the presumption.27
Through all of these cases there appears an undercur-
rent of desire on the part of the courts not to permit a
will to fail merely because the witnesses cannot be pro-
duced or because their memories are not infallible. But
the statute is mandatory and its requirements must be
met. Therefore, the presumption of fact is resorted to,
where the instrument itself appears regular on its face.
This presumption is indulged in whether or not there is
an attestation clause. Indeed, courts have not recog-
nized the evidenciary value of the attestation clause it-
self. Their decisions have merely noted that a full and
complete attestation clause strengthens this presumption
of due execution. True, such a clause is not a formal
requisite, but it does not follow that it is without evi-
dentiary value.
It is advisable to turn our attention now to a consid-
eration of cases decided in the courts of the United
States. Since the statutes which prescribe the formalities
to be observed in the execution of wills differ in their de-
tails in each of the states, it is impossible to consider
them individually. Consequently, the state of Illinois has
been selected as an example. The principles discussed
are of general application, although the formal requisites
may vary.
The section of the Illinois statute setting forth the
formalities to be observed in the execution of wills is as
follows:
All wills, testaments and codicils, by which any lands, tene-
ments, hereditaments, annuities, rents or goods and chattels
are devised, shall be reduced to writing, and signed by the
testator or testatrix, or by some person in his or her presence,
and by his or her direction, and attested in the presence of the
testator or testatrix, by two or more credible witnesses, two
27 Gove v. Gawen, 3 Curt. 151.
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of whom, declaring on oath or affirmation, before the County
Court of the proper county, that they were present and saw
the testator or testatrix sign said will, testament or codicil,
in their presence, or acknowledged the same to be his or her
act and deed, and that they believed the testator or testatrix
to be of sound mind and memory at the time of signing or ac-
knowledging the same, shall be sufficient proof of the execu-
tion of said will, testament or codicil, to admit the same to
record .... 28
In construing this section, the Supreme Court of Illinois
has held that four things must concur to entitle a will
to probate. First, it must be in writing, signed by the
testator or in his presence by someone under his direc-
tion; second, it must be attested by two or more credible
witnesses; third, two witnesses must prove that they saw
the testator sign the will or that he acknowledged the
same to be his act and deed; and, fourth, the witnesses
must swear that they believed the testator was of sound
mind and memory at the time of signing or acknowledg-
ing the will.
2 9
In view of the construction thus placed upon the stat-
ute, it becomes material to consider what proof is neces-
sary to entitle a will to probate where one or both of the
attesting witnesses are dead or absent from the jurisdic-
tion, so that their testimony cannot be had.
Section six of the Wills Act provides:
In all cases where any one or more of the witnesses of any
will, testament or codicil, as aforesaid, shall die, be insane, be
blind or remove to parts unknown to the parties concerned,
so that his or her testimony can not be procured, it shall be
lawful for the County Court, or other court having jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter to admit proof of the handwriting
of any such deceased, insane, blind, or absent witness, as
aforesaid, and such other secondary evidence as is admissible
in courts of justice, to establish written contracts generally
28 Cahill's fli. Rev. St. (1931), Ch. 148, sec. 2.
29 Glos v. Sclildbacb, 344 I1 23; Hill v. Chicago Title and Trust
Company, 322 1. 42; In re Estate of Kohley, 200 Ill. 189; Canatsey et al.
v. Canatsey et al., 130 fI1. 397; Dickie et al. v. Carter, 42 Il. 376.
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in similar cases; and may thereupon proceed to record the
same, as though such will, testament or codicil had been
proved by such subscribing witnesses, in his, her, or their
proper persons.8 0
This section of the statute was considered by the court
in the case of Robinson et al. v. Brewster et al.31 In that
case one of the attesting witnesses pre-deceased the tes-
tator. A bill in equity was filed to set aside the probate
of the will. Upon trial the surviving witness testified
that he and the deceased witness were present and saw
the testator sign the will; that he signed it in the presence
of, and at the request of, the testator; that he saw the
deceased witness sign; and that he believed the testator
to be of sound mind and memory at the time of signing.
The handwriting of the deceased witness was then
proved. The court held that the proof required by sec-
tion two of the Wills Act was furnished and that there
was a concurrence of the four requisites entitling the
will to probate. There was no attestation clause to this
will.
The evidenciary effect of an attestation clause to a
will was discussed by the same court in the case of Ho-
bart v. Hobart.2 There a will and codicil containing an
attestation clause were offered for probate in the County
Court of McLean County. The attestation clause read,
"Written, signed, and sealed in the presence of," fol-
lowed by the signatures of the two witnesses. An appeal
was taken to the circuit court from an order admitting
the will to probate. It was proved in the circuit court
that one of the attesting witnesses was dead. The sur-
viving witness testified that she signed in the presence
of the testator and at his request. She also testified, to-
gether with two other witnesses, to the handwriting of
the deceased witness. The circuit court held that the.
will was entitled to probate and this decision was af-
firmed by the Appellate Court. Upon appeal to the
30 Cahill, Ill. Rev. St. (1931) Ch. 148, Sec. 6.
3 140 Ill. 649.
32 154 Ill. 610.
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Supreme Court it was objected that the re~ord did not
show the testimony of the two subscribing witnesses.
The court held that, under section six of the Wills Act,
the will was properly proved, and said:
Proof of the handwriting of the deceased witness is prima
facie sufficient, especially where the signatures of the wit-
nesses are attached to an attesting clause that the will or
codicil was written, signed, and sealed in their presence. The
death of the witness merely changes the form of the proof.
It permits secondary evidence to be introduced of the due
attestation and execution of the will. The attestation is then
to be shown, as it would in the case of deeds, by proof of the
handwriting of the witness. As to him, it is to be presumed
that he duly attested the will in the presence of the testator.
In the Hobart case the surviving witness could not re-
member whether the signature of the testatrix was on
the paper when she signed as a witness. The court held
that mere lack of memory could not overcome the pre-
sumption of due execution arising from the fact of at-
testation and said there is a presumption that he has
signed when the testator requests the witnesses to attest
his will.
In both of the cases just mentioned, the testimony of
one witness was available. No discussion of the presump-
tion of due execution is complete without mentioning the
case of Elston v. Montgomery.8 This case originated
with a bill in equity filed, according to the provisions of
the statute, to contest the will of Blanche S. Clarke.
Proper execution of the will was denied by the bill. Both
of the attesting witnesses, had pre-deceased the testator
by many years. Evidence was introduced to show that
the signature to the will was not in the handwriting of
the testatrix. The defendants proved the handwriting of
the two witnesses but offered no further proof. The
court held that it was not necessary to prove the hand-
writing of the testatrix, since the statute provides that
a will may be signed by someone other than the testator
33 242 -11. 348.
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or testatrix in his presence. Proof of the handwriting
of the deceased witnesses coupled with the attestation
clause which recited the fact of acknowledgment was suf-
ficient to make a prima facie case.
These Illinois cases appear to be in full accord with
the English decisions mentioned. Where the attesting
witnesses are dead or absent from the jurisdiction, a
presumption of due execution arises from proof of the
witnesses' handwriting. This presumption is also ap-
plied where the witnesses do not recollect the facts.34 And
to make the comparison complete, we find that the court
in Illinois holds that this presumption is strengthened
where there is a full and complete attestation clause.3 5
The case of Hayhurst et at. v. Jones 36 is an apt illus-
tration of the lengths to which the presumption may be
carried. Here, both attesting witnesses appeared in the
probate court and denied their signatures. Probate was
denied and an appeal was taken to the circuit court where
proponents called both attesting witnesses and had each
identify specimens of his signature and handwriting.
Handwriting experts were then called who identified the
signatures on the will by comparison with the specimens.
The attesting witnesses were recalled and again denied
their signatures, but were confused and mistaken as to
events occurring about the same time. The circuit court
decided that the will was entitled to probate and this de-
cision was upheld by the appellate court. An excerpt
from the opinion is as follows:
• . . while our courts heretofore have not dealt with a case
precisely like this where the attesting witnesses deny their
signatures, still they have repeatedly, in the cases before cited,
indorsed holdings of other courts that the probate of a will
does not depend on the recollection or even the veracity of a
subscribing witness.
84 Hobart v. Hobart, supra; Gould v. Chicago Theological Seminary,
189 Il. 282.
35Kuehne v. Malach, 286 Ill. 120; O'Brien v. Estate of Rhembe, 269
Ill. 592.
36 215 Il. App. 315.
ATTESTATION CLAUSE IN A FILL
The provisions of the Wills Act in Illinois are peculiar.
Section two, before quoted, requires that two witnesses
declare upon oath or affirmation before the county court
that they believed the testator to be of sound mind and
memory at the time they signed as witnesses. This pro-
vision is not found in the Statute of Frauds nor is a
similar provision contained in the statutes of most states.
The significance of this fact is that proof of the hand-
writing of a deceased witness must be held to be proof
that such witness believed the testator to be of sufficient
mental capacity. In other words, the presumption of
due execution includes also a belief of the witness as to
the mental condition of the testator.
The case of More v. More U decided the question of a
presumption of testamentary capacity. The contestants
objected to the probate of the will on the ground that
there was not sufficient proof of testamentary capacity as
required by the statute since the attesting witnesses were
dead. The supreme court in considering this question
said:
The act of attestation of a will is not merely to witness the
mere fact that the testator signed the will or acknowledged
that he had signed the same, but the attention of the witnesses
is called, by the act of attestation, to the mental condition of
the testator and as to whether he is possessed of a sound, dis-
posing mind, and, therefore, if the will appears on the face
thereof to have been duly executed and it is proven that
the signatures thereto are in the genuine writing of the maker
and the witnesses, if the attesting witnesses be dead an infer-
ence arises, from the mere fact of attestation, that the wit-
nesses believed that the testator possessed testamentary ca-
pacity at the time of the execution of the will, though there
be no formal recital to that effect.
At one time it was necessary to produce the witnesses
themselves, and nothing would excuse their non-appear-
ance. The discussion thus far seems to lead to the con-
clusion that the court will presume a will to have been
37 211 II. 268.
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duly executed if the handwriting of the witnesses is
proved, where the witnesses are unavailable or their tes-
timony is conflicting. As we have seen, this presumption
arises out of necessity, in order that the will not fail.
Where there is a full and complete attestation clause,
containing a recital of the very facts in issue, we might
expect that the recital would be considered as evidence by
the courts. Yet it is here that the decisions lead us
astray. The courts repeatedly say that the effect of such
a recital is to strengthen the presumption.
It seems logical enough to say that where there is no
attestation clause or where the attestation clause does
not contain a recital of the fact or facts in dispute, com-
pliance with statutory requirements will be presumed, if
the signatures of the witnesses are proved. In other
words, where it is proved that a man set his name to a
will and is not the maker of the will it may be taken for
granted that he signed as a witness. It is probable that,
having signed as a witness, he did what he intended to
do; namely, attest the execution of the instrument in such
a manmer as to satisfy the statutory requirements. Such
a supposition is entitled to weight as evidence in the
absence of proof to the contrary.
The basis of our presumption may be stated thus, fol-
lowing the doctrine laid down by the United States Su-
preme Court in Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Hill-
mon:38 Where there is evidence of an intention to do a
particular act, an inference arises that such an act was
in fact done, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
Therefore, when it is established that a person signs his
name to a document as a witness, intending thereby to
satisfy certain statutory requirements as to attestation,
it is to be presumed that he did in fact satisfy those re-
quirements. Considered in this way, what we have is a
presumption of fact entitled to weight as such. This pre-
sumption is the basis of the decisions before referred to.
38 145 U. S. 285.
ATTESTATION CLAUSE IN A WILL
Something besides mere evidence of an intention ex-
ists where there is a full and complete attestation clause.
If the question in issue is whether or not certain acts
have been done, a recital of those acts in an attestation
clause signed by the witnesses thereto is an express dec-
laration that those acts have been done. Courts have
given effect to such recitals, although the true doctrine
has been disguised under statements that the presump-
tion is strengthened thereby.
We have referred at considerable length to the trans-
action witness who was required to be produced to prove
the acts of which a document was evidence. At a later
time, when" such documents became indisputable or in ef-
fect became in themselves the acts, the need for witnesses
continued in order to prove the execution. When, in the
law of wills, statutes were passed requiring execution in
a particular manner, a mode of proof of such execution
was provided.
In other words, these statutes require an act of the wit-
nesses themselves-the act of attesting. This act pro-
vides the basis of proof where the attestation clause con-
tains a recital of the facts in issue. Since attestation
itself is an act done, such recitals in the attestation clause
are declarations by the witnesses at the time of doing
an act. Being declarations made contemporaneously
with an act required by the statute, they are admissible
in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.3 9 This
has been the principle that has been constantly over-
looked by the courts in considering this class of cases.
Instead of merely strengthening the presumption of
due execution, these recitals are evidence of the facts
contained therein. Thus, in Illinois, where an attesta-
tion clause contains a statement that the witnesses be-
lieved the testator to be of sound mind and memory, such
a statement is equivalent to a positive assertion of the
witnesses made at the time they signed their names. If
the witnesses. are dead, absent from the jurisdiction, or
39 Wigmore, Vol. III, sees. 1.505-1514.
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insane, no distinction appears between these and other
declarations admitted in like cases as exceptions to the
hearsay rule. Indeed, the principle of the res gestae is
broad enough to admit such declarations where the wit-
nesses do not remember the facts or where their testi-
mony is conflicting.
It is said by some authorities that when the witness
signs as witness he impliedly testifies at the time of sign-
ing to all of the facts required by the statute." In other
words, in the absence of an attestation clause, declara-
tions of the witnesses are to be implied; and such im-
plied declarations are admissible upon the same basis as
if they had been expressly made in an attestation clause.
It is believed that this is unsound, and when some fact,
of which there is no recital, is in issue, the presumption
must be relied upon. Some difficulty might be experi-
enced with this presumption in Illinois where the stat-
ute requires that two witnesses state that they believed
the testator to be of sound mind and memory at the time
of attestation. However, it is to be remembered that the
statute does not require the witness so to state at the
time of attesting. Therefore, it seems an unnecessary
extension of the doctrine to say that the witnesses im-
pliedly made such a statement. It seems sounder to rely
upon a presumption that the witnesses so believed at the
time they signed, coupled with the presumption that all
men are sane.
In conclusion, the attestation clause in a will has had
a definite influence on decisions of courts of many states.
It has quite generally been revealed as an influence on
the presumption of due execution.41 Perhaps because an
attestation clause has not been required by statute, courts
have been disposed to disregard its evidentiary features
and have been satisfied to say that the presumption of
due execution is strengthened by its recitals. Neverthe-
less, an attestation clause may be considered as evidence
which is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
40Wigmore, Vol. IV, see. 1511.
41 Butcher v. Butcher, 21 Colo. App. 416; Underwood v. Thurman,
111 Ga. 325; Hull v Hull, 117 Iowa 738; Barnes v. Barnes, 66 Me. 286;
Fatherbee v. Lawrence, 33 Miss. 585; Holyoke v. Sipp, et al, 77 Neb.
394; Turnure v. Turnure, 35 N. J. Eq. 437; Matter of Will of John
Kellum, 52 N. Y. 517; Carpenter v. Denoon et al., 29 Ohio St. 379; Will
of John Meurer, 44 Wis. 392.
